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In an era of intractable legislative gridlock and unabashed 
governance-by-executive-order, congressional oversight holds 
promise as a means of buttressing Congress’s role in the 
policymaking process, and thus helping to restore the 
legislature’s place as a co-equal branch.  Despite the 
demonstrated effectiveness of congressional oversight (when it 
occurs) little is known regarding whether legislators can 
design administrative agencies so as to strengthen ties 
between these agencies and their political principals in 
Congress.  Leveraging data on agency characteristics, agency-
subcommittee relationships, and congressional oversight, this 
article explores the connections between various agency 
design features and congressional oversight levels.  The article 
finds that (i) agencies with leaders that are confirmed by the 
Senate receive greater attention from congressional overseers; 
(ii) independent agencies appear to be more independent of 
congressional as well as presidential control, contrary to a 
conventional wisdom that they tend to reflect Congress’s 
preferences; and (iii) subcommittee jurisdictional 
fragmentation or redundancy is associated with greater 
oversight.  Through greater attention to agency design, 
Congress can create future executive agencies and retrofit 
existing agencies to optimize congressional control of these 
agencies in the future.  Thus, legislators desiring to reverse 
their branch’s declining influence over the administrative state 
should devote their attention to the careful design of 
bureaucratic institutions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Can agency structures influence levels of congressional control over 
the administrative state?  This question is not merely academic.  Debates 
over the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau several years 
ago called attention to the relationship between agency design and political 
accountability.  The agency’s unique mix of design features has been a 
persistent source of controversy since its proposal.1  Indeed, much of the 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., Bernie Becker, Defund, Delay, Defang, THE HILL, May 3, 2011 
(available at http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-
institutions/159097-overnight-money-defund-delay-defang); Victoria 
McGrane & Deborah Solomon, With New Power, GOP Takes On 
Consumer Agency, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 2010. 
These design features of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
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public criticism of the agency has focused on its institutional design.2 
At first glance, it may be surprising that institutional design issues 
figured so prominently in debates over what may be the most consequential 
new agency created in a generation.3  After all, the agency’s regulatory 
jurisdiction, rulemaking powers, and personnel decisions all may appear 
more closely connected to policy outcomes.  As a growing chorus of 
administrative law scholars has shown, however, administrative structures 
play a significant role in enabling political control, and, consequently, in 
determining policy outcomes.4  For instance, Christopher Berry and Jacob 
Gersen empirically determine that the extent to which the President or 
Congress controls agency personnel decisions is associated with the degree 
to which agencies are responsive to those bodies’ potential preferences 
concerning the distribution of government funds.5  Writing from a different 
                                                                                                                                      
include its leadership by a single director, with a fixed term and for-cause 
removal protection; the relative lack of control mechanisms available to its 
nominal parent agency, the Federal Reserve Board; and its access to an 
independent funding source, apart from the congressional appropriations 
process.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (stating its 
director’s employment terms); Id. § 1012(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1965 
(preventing the Federal Reserve from “interven[ing] in any matter or 
proceeding”); id. § 1012(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1966 (prohibiting the Federal 
Reserve from involvement in Bureau personnel decisions); id. § 
1012(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1966 (disallowing the Federal Reserve from 
reorganizing the agency’s structure); Id. § 1017(a), 124 Stat. at 1975-76 
(requiring that the Federal Reserve transfer any “reasonably necessary” 
funds that the Bureau requests). 
 
2 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S2774 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Richard Shelby). 
 
3 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15, 18 (2010).  
 
4 See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob Gersen, Agency Design and 
Distributive Politics, Working Paper (2010); Barkow, supra note __; Daniel 
E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan 
Requirements on Regulation (AM. LAW & ECON. ASS’N, Working Paper No. 
73, 2007); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 
5 Berry & Gersen, supra note __, at 12-13.  In some respects, Berry and 
Gersen’s research serves as a template for this article, in that both their 
research and this article identify and collect data on a specific outcome-
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perspective, Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast theorize 
that the design of administrative procedures can encourage agencies to 
remain faithful to congressional preferences.6   
Of course, administrative procedures are just one of many agency 
features that Congress can vary, and the distribution of government monies 
is one of many possible outcomes that agency design may influence.  
Institutional designers in Congress also have control over an array of more 
basic features in agency creation, such as whether an agency is headed by a 
commission or single individual; whether appointees require Senate 
confirmation; and the size, scope, and exclusivity of their policy domains.  
As with administrative procedures, Congress chooses these institutional 
design features as part of the background framework in which agencies 
operate.  As such, they are potential ex ante mechanisms for congressional 
control. 
This article empirically analyzes the extent to which various 
institutional design features are associated with oversight attention.  The 
article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses Congress’s diminished 
policymaking authority vis-à-vis the executive branch and argues that 
legislators’ renewed attention to oversight of administrative agencies would 
reverse this downward trend—with the benefits of oversight amplified were 
Congress to design agencies so as to maximize the agencies’ responsiveness 
to congressional monitoring.  Part II provides an overview of the extant 
literature of political control over executive agencies, situating the project 
of determining which agency design features promote or hinder 
                                                                                                                                      
based measure – monetary outlays in Berry and Gersen, congressional 
oversight hearings here – and empirically test hypothesized correlations 
between these respective dependent variables and the presence or absence 
of various agency design features. 
 
6 See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political 
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, 
Structure and Process] (identifying the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–
706, as ex ante means of ensuring that agencies are politically responsive to 
affected interest groups).  See also Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus 
Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note __; 
McNollgast, Procedures as Instruments, supra note __; McCubbins & 
Schwartz, supra note __, at 173.  See generally Arthur Lupia & Mathew 
McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBLEMS 91 (1994) (providing examples of administrative procedures that 
Congress can manipulate to further its goals). 
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congressional oversight in a larger literature on institutional design.  Parts 
III and IV, respectively, present and test a set of hypotheses concerning 
agency features that may be correlated with oversight activity.   
I. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 
A. The Need for Congress as a Co-Equal Branch 
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of a well-functioning 
Congress to American democracy.  William Blackstone warned that the 
“total union” of legislative and executive functions “would be productive of 
tyranny,” whereas the “total disjunction of them for the present, would in 
the end produce the same effects, by [eventually] causing that union against 
which it seems to provide.”7  Recognizing both the dangers of unified 
control of the federal government and the inherent instability of completely 
distinct legislative and executive functions, the founders devised a system 
of co-equal branches, which allows “[a]mbition . . . to counteract 
ambition.”8  This system, which political scientist Richard Neustadt 
characterized as “separated institutions sharing power,”9  serves as a 
bulwark against tyranny, providing an “auxiliary precaution[]” that 
“oblige[s] . . . [the federal government] to control itself.”10   
 Beyond keeping potential tyrants in-check, a co-equal Congress 
provides many other good-government benefits.  For instance, a group of 
Brookings Institution scholars argues that deeper congressional involvement 
ex ante in new policy proposals would encourage pre-enactment cost-
benefit analyses and that greater attention to oversight ex post could 
decrease the likelihood of major policy failures.11  The involvement of a 
                                                     
7 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 149 (1765). 
 
8 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
 
9 RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 
42 (1964); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation 
of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1147–52 (2000). 
 
10 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
 
11 See Sarah A. Binder, Thomas E. Mann, Norman J. Ornstein & Molly 
Reynolds, Assessing the 100th Congress, Anticipating the 111th, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0108_broken_branch_binder_mann.
aspx. 
 
 6 
collective legislature in the policymaking process promotes deliberation, 
facilitates the participation of diverse groups, and encourages transparency 
in policymaking—all of which lead to better reasoned and more 
democratically reflective policy outcomes.12  
Further, public debate and contestation between Congress and the executive 
branch can perform a truth-revealing function, akin to adversarial 
proceedings in court.13 
B. Congress’s Shirking Role in Governance 
 
Despite the vital role that Congress was designed to play, 
congressional capacity—i.e., Congress’s relative influence over the nation’s 
legal landscape—is waning.14  Over the past several Congresses, there has 
been a marked drop in laws enacted, a decreased willingness of the Senate 
to consider presidential nominees, and record numbers of cloture votes per 
session.15 
 With Congress’s role in policymaking on the decline,16 the 
executive branch has stepped in.  Since the New Deal era, presidents have 
been increasingly willing to set policy via executive order.17  The creation 
                                                     
12 See generally JAMES FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION 
(2009) (on the benefits of deliberation in policymaking); Heather K. 
Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (on 
first- and second-order diversity); Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How 
Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists 
Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579 (2009) (on transparency). 
 
13 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 715, 771 
(2012). 
 
14 See THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN 
BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO 
GET IT BACK ON TRACK 97 (2006). 
 
15 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem 
of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2218-19 (2013). 
 
16 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2311 (2001) (“[T]he possibility of significant legislative 
accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of divided government with 
high polarization . . . .”). 
 
17 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of 
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of the White House Office of Management & Budget in the 1970s and the 
empowerment, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, of its Office of 
Information & Regulatory Affairs to reject proposed regulations based on 
cost-benefit analysis further bolstered presidential control.18   
The trend toward “presidential administration” has continued 
unabashedly during the Obama administration.  During one twelve-month 
period in 2011 and, President Obama announced forty-five executive 
actions under his administration’s “We Can’t Wait” initiative. 19  For 
instance, after a Senate filibuster blocked an up-or-down vote on the 
DREAM Act,20 which, inter alia, would have authorized the issuance of 
work visas to certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United 
States before age sixteen, President Barack Obama implemented a policy in 
2012 to do just that.21   
The very title of the “We Can’t Wait” initiative implies that, while 
Congress ought to act, the President will act where Congress has not done 
so.  As such, it conveys a lack of patience with traditional notions of 
legislative supremacy that hold Congress to be the nation’s lawmaker.22  In 
some instances, however, President Obama has gone still further, not even 
providing an opportunity for Congress to act before announcing unilateral 
executive action.23 
                                                                                                                                      
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999). 
 
18 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2275-81, 2285-90 (2001). 
 
19 See Kenneth S. Lowanda and Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: 
Barack Obama, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 
12 THE FORUM 3, 9 (2014). 
 
20 DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 
21 Christi Parsons & Kathleen Hennessey, Thwarted by Congress, Obama to 
Stop Deporting Young Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/15/news/la-pn-thwarted-by-congress-
obama-will-stop-deporting-young-illegal-immigrants-20120615. 
 
22 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 
78 GEO. L.J. 281, 293 (1989) (“Violations of the [legislative] supremacy 
principal are particularly serious because they impair the basic social norm 
of democratic self-government.”). 
 
23 See id. at 6 (“The Obama administration . . . occasionally resorted to 
unilateral action as a first resort in bringing about non-incremental policy 
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Moreover, recent developments suggest that even greater 
centralization of policymaking authority in the executive branch is on the 
horizon.  Eric Posner points to the “normaliz[ation]” Federal Reserve’s 
sustained, post-financial crisis policy of purchasing bonds to stimulate 
economic growth, which is an “overtly fiscal aspect[] of central bank 
activity.”24  Because the “power to tax and spend is at the core of sovereign 
power,” a regulatory agency’s gradual intrusion into the core of Congress’s 
authority may be a harbinger of even greater diminution of Congress’s role 
in governance in the future.25 
C. The Promise of Oversight in Restoring Congress’s Role 
 
In light of the substantial delegation of policymaking authority from 
the legislative to the executive branch26 and taking as a given Congress’s 
unwillingness to overcome legislative gridlock to reassert its primacy,27 
congressional oversight of agency action is perhaps the most powerful tool 
that Congress has to exercise some measure of control over administrative 
policy.28  An empirical examination of the consequences of congressional 
oversight reveals that bureaucratic issues that are the subject of committee 
hearings are 22 percent less likely to reoccur than are similar bureaucratic 
issues that are not subject to hearings.29  This 22 percent reduction in the 
                                                                                                                                      
change.”) (emphasis in original). 
 
24 Eric Posner, “The Next Stage in Administrative Centralization: Fiscal 
Policy.” Available on-line at http://ericposner.com/the-next-stage-in-
administrative-centralization-fiscal-policy (Aug. 29, 2016). 
 
25 Id. 
 
26 See supra at __. 
 
27 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2107, 2107-08 (2013) (describing “praise for gridlock” from prominent 
political observers). 
 
28 See Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Government Rebooted: 
Randomized Committee Assignments and Legislative Capacity, 7 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 139, 159 (2013). 
 
29 See Brian D. Feinstein, OVERSIGHT, DESPITE THE ODDS: ASSESSING 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS AS A MEANS OF CONTROL OVER 
THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 18 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University) (on file with Pusey Library, Harvard University). 
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recurrence of bureaucratic “infractions” following congressional attention – 
which is statistically significant, holds true when controlling for a battery of 
potentially relevant factors, and is robust to various model specifications – 
demonstrates that committee oversight hearings can be a remarkably 
effective means of channeling administrative action towards Congress’s 
preferences.30  Further, oversight thus offers Congress a second, indirect 
means of impacting policy; Douglas Kriner and Eric Schickler demonstrate 
increases in the number of high-profile oversight hearings are correlated 
with decreased public support for the President.31 
 In a climate of heightened legislative gridlock and a turn toward 
government-by-executive-action, oversight holds great potential as a means 
of congressional control over the administrative state.  This demonstrated 
promise of oversight is encouraging to those that believe that Congress 
ought to get off the sidelines and re-take its central place in governance.  
Yet, despite oversight’s demonstrated effectiveness – and even greater 
potential effectiveness – little is known about how Congress can optimize 
the effectiveness of the oversight that it conducts.  Namely, can Congress 
design executive agencies in a manner that maximizes these agencies’ 
responsiveness to congressional overseers?  This article seeks to answer this 
question. 
II. PAST SCHOLARSHIP ON POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY  
 
This article is situated within a literature on optimizing agency 
design to encourage incentive-compatibility between administrative 
agencies and the political branches.32  This past scholarship can be divided 
into three subgenres.  First, positive political theorists have explored how 
the design of administrative procedures can encourage agencies to remain 
faithful to congressional preferences.33  Much of this literature is vague 
                                                                                                                                      
 
30 See id. 
 
31 See Douglas Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: 
Committee Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, at 12–17 (2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900886.  
 
32 These studies notwithstanding, I will argue that the amount of attention 
that public administration scholarship has devoted to connections between 
agency design and congressional influence has not been commensurate with 
the subject’s importance. 
 
33 See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: 
 10 
about what specifically constitutes an administrative procedure, process or 
structure, leading to claims that may be unfalsifiable.34  Others writing in 
this area focus on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 194635 as an 
ex ante means of ensuring that agencies are politically responsive to 
affected interest groups.36  The fact that the APA provides a procedural 
floor for virtually all agency rulemakings,37 however, stymies empirical 
                                                                                                                                      
Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 62 (1995); David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative 
Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 
(1994); Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, Structure 
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter 
McNollgast, Structure and Process]; McNollgast, Procedures as 
Instrument, supra note 10; Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 
28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 173 (1984).  See generally Arthur Lupia and 
Mathew McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 91 (1994) (providing examples of administrative 
procedures that Congress can manipulate to further its goals).  These studies 
conceptualize “congressional preferences” as the preferences either of the 
enacting legislative coalition or the current Congress. 
 
34 See Robinson, supra note 10, at 487 (claiming that the “generic terms” in 
McNollgast’s model, e.g., “‘process’ and ‘structure’ … can cover a wide 
range of procedural and organizational variation,” making them “not very 
helpful in focusing our search for corroborative evidence”).  But see Bawn, 
supra note, at 62 (providing greater specificity regarding the administrative 
procedures that Congress may use to slant agency decisions towards the 
enacting coalitions’ current preferences or the prospective preferences of 
favored interests groups).  Bawn cites the criteria for selecting outside 
participants in agency decision-making; the rules governing the timing of 
agency decisions; and the method by which outside parties may challenge 
agency decisions as examples of administrative procedures that Congress 
can manipulate to privilege certain groups in the administrative process.  Id. 
 
35 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 
36 See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 13; McNollgast, 
Procedures as Instruments, supra note 10.  
 
37 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 6 
(2006).  But see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (listing agencies that are exempted from 
APA coverage).  Also note that the APA’s procedural floor does not extend 
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tests of the supposed “deck-stacking” consequences of these procedural 
defaults.  In other words, the relative lack of variation in rulemaking 
procedures below what the APA requires makes quantitative analysis of its 
effects challenging.38 
Of course, administrative procedures are just one of many agency 
features that Congress may vary.  Institutional designers in Congress also 
have control over an array of more basic features in agency creation, e.g., 
whether an agency is headed by a commission or single individual; whether 
appointees require Senate confirmation; and the size, scope, and exclusivity 
of their policy domains.  As with administrative procedures, Congress 
chooses these institutional design features as part of the background 
framework in which agencies operate.  As such, they are potential ex ante 
mechanisms for congressional control.  It is reasonable to assume, therefore, 
that congressional designers, interested in structuring agencies to be 
responsive to the enacting coalition, future Congresses, or favored interest 
groups may devote attention to agency design issues as well as 
administrative procedures.  Despite the theoretical importance of agency 
design features to ex ante congressional control, however, the formal 
theoretical literature has largely ignored these fundamental design features, 
instead focusing on administrative procedures.39 
Second, numerous case studies have examined the institutional 
features of particular agencies, probing the interaction between institutional 
design and responsiveness to political principals.40  Unlike much of the 
work in the other two sub-literatures discussed in this section, authors of 
                                                                                                                                      
to agency adjudications.  See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 
(1950) (holding that, although the APA provides the default rules for 
adjudications, the APA does not apply in cases where another statute 
explicitly mandates procedures that satisfy the Due Process Clause, even if 
these procedures fall below what the APA would otherwise have required). 
 
38 But see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (listing agencies that are exempted from APA 
coverage). 
 
39 But see Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control 
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992) (arguing, in a 
narrative essay, that Congress’s decision to charge an agency with 
regulating one or multiple industries will have policy consequences). 
 
40 See Berry and Gersen, supra note 5 (providing a list of these case studies 
concerning the institutional design and political responsiveness of particular 
agencies, e.g., the FTC, NLRB, FERC, IRS, Army Corps of Engineers, 
ICC, Forest Service, EPA, Federal Reserve, and EEOC). 
 
 12 
these single agency studies seek to determine the extent to which agencies 
with various design features are responsive to Congress or the President,41 
or whether agency action varies with the political composition of the elected 
branches.42  Since scholarship situated within this literature focuses 
exclusively on one particular agency, the lack of variation in design features 
studied prevents these authors from offering inferences concerning the 
relative role of particular design features on outcomes.43 
Third, a set of authors has undertaken empirical studies of 
institutional design.44  Scholarship in this vein often examines how the 
political climate at the time of an agency’s creation is associated with 
different agency design features.  Various features of the political climate 
(e.g., divided government) are operationalized as independent variables, 
with a particular agency design feature being the dependent variable.  With 
this methodological framework, these studies examine what political factors 
influence agency design.  They do not address how, if at all, agency design 
features impact the ongoing, post-enactment relationship between agencies 
and their political principals. 
Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen’s work on agency design 
                                                     
41 See id. 
 
42 See David M. Hedge and Renee J. Johnson, The Plot that Failed: The 
Republican Revolution and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy, 12 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 333 (2002) (finding that two agencies cut 
back on their regulatory activities following the Republicans regaining 
control of Congress in 1995). 
 
43 See Berry and Gersen, supra note 5 (noting that “studies of individual 
agencies … are largely incapable of identifying the role of agency design on 
responsiveness … [because (1)] the relevant institutional features almost 
never vary within a single agency … [and (2)] most policy outputs—where 
one would look to see evidence of political control—are not readily 
comparable across agencies”). 
 
44 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN AND SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING 
POWERS (1999); DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
(2008); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 
(2003).  See also Craig W. Thomas, Reorganizing Public Organizations: 
Alternatives, Objectives, and Evidence, 3 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
457, 457 (1993) (noting that “empirical studies of the effects of specific 
reorganizations always have lagged well behind the theoretical claims” in 
the public administration literature). 
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features and distributive politics stands apart from these three strands of the 
literature on institutional design and agency responsiveness.45  Berry and 
Gersen test whether a host of agency characteristics are correlated with 
agency responsiveness to Congress and the President.  These authors 
marshal data on federal spending by agency and congressional district to 
determine whether agencies with specific structural features tend to disperse 
more funds to districts represented by majority party members or the 
President’s co-partisans than do agencies without those features.46  They 
find that the extent to which the President or Congress controls agency 
personnel decisions is associated with the degree to which agencies are 
responsive to those bodies’ potential preferences.47  In some respects, Berry 
and Gersen’s work serves as a template for this article, in that both articles 
seek to determine how agency design features affect outcomes.  
Specifically, both articles identify and collect data on a specific outcome-
based measure – monetary outlays in Berry and Gersen, congressional 
oversight hearings in this article – and empirically test hypothesized 
correlations between these dependent variables and the presence or absence 
of various agency design features. 
This article contributes to the existing literature on agency design 
and political responsiveness by empirically analyzing how various 
institutional design features are associated with a cognizable outcome: 
congressional oversight activity.  This article differs from much of the 
formal theoretical literature in that it moves beyond theoretical claims 
regarding “administrative procedures” or vaguely defined agency 
characteristics to quantitatively examine specific design features.  The 
study’s large sample encompasses all bureaus in existence during the 1987-
2004 period, allowing for significant variation in the design features under 
study.48  This variation is necessary to make inferences regarding the 
                                                     
45 Berry and Gersen, supra note 5. 
 
46 Id 
. 
47 Id. at 12-13.  More specifically, they find that (i) the advantage that 
members of the President’s party have in receiving federal funds to their 
districts is positively correlated with the agency’s proportion of political 
appointees; and (ii) the advantage that members of the majority party have 
in receiving federal funds is positively correlated with the agency’s 
proportion of Senate-confirmed appointees.  Id.  They also comment on the 
connections between outlays and other design features, including for-cause 
removal and agency governance by a multi-member board.  Id. at 16-17. 
 
48 These years correspond to the 100th through 108th Congresses. 
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possible associations between design features and outcomes.  Departing 
from most prior empirical work – with the exception of Berry & Gersen – I 
utilize two outcome-based measures, House and Senate oversight activity, 
to examine the correlations between various agency characteristics and 
actual outputs.49   
The design features included in this article are not exhaustive, but 
rather represent what I believe should be an early step in a larger research 
agenda probing the relationship between the institutional design of 
administrative agencies and congressional oversight.  Such explorations are 
worthwhile, because, as Part II demonstrates, oversight enables Congress to 
retain some measure of control over delegated powers.  Thus, greater 
attention to agency design may provide a window into how to optimize 
congressional influence over the administrative state. 
III. HYPOTHESES 
A. Congress’s Initial Involvement in Agency Creation 
 
 According to Randall Calvert, Mathew McCubbins, and Barry 
Weingast, whether an agency is more responsive to Congress or the 
President depends primarily on the relative involvement of each branch in 
the agency’s initial design.50  As a test of these authors’ positive claim that 
ex ante design decisions are the central means by which the political 
branches can exercise influence over agency policy outcomes,51  I examine 
the connection between congressional oversight levels and whether an 
agency was created via congressional or executive action.52  Following their 
theory, I hypothesize that Congress will devote greater attention to agencies 
                                                     
49 But see Berry and Gersen, supra note 5 (employing federal spending as a 
dependent variable common to all studied agencies). 
 
50 Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, & Barry R. Weingast, A 
Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 
604 (1989). 
 
51 Id. at 604-05. 
 
52 Although most agencies are established via statute, a nontrivial number 
are created via executive order, reorganization plan, or departmental order.  
See David E. Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, 
available at IQSS Dataverse Network, 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:19
02.1/10129&studyListingIndex=0_d1de20ebf2b96353b798a93359b8. 
 
 15 
that are statutory creations, since Congress may have a greater ability to 
influence these agencies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Congress devotes greater attention to overseeing 
agencies that were created via statute. 
 
 Extending this logic, Congress may devote greater attention to 
agencies that are headed by Senate-confirmed appointees, since the Senate 
confirmation process provides another means to promote agency 
responsiveness to congressional interests.  The adage “personnel is policy” 
has long been used in Washington to describe the importance for a new 
President to appoint political loyalists.53  Senators also understand the vital 
role that appointees play in setting policy, and therefore bargain 
aggressively with the President over personnel.54  The Senate’s advice and 
consent function in considering thousands of nominees annually may enable 
the chamber to play an outsized role in influencing agencies whose leaders 
must receive Senate approval.55  It follows that the Senate’s greater ability 
to influence agencies headed by Senate-confirmed appointees may make 
oversight attention to these agencies more productive and rewarding for 
senators.  Thus, I hypothesize that the Senate will devote greater oversight 
attention to agencies that are headed by Senate-confirmed appointees. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The Senate more frequently oversees agencies whose 
leaders are Senate-confirmed appointees. 
                                                     
53 See, e.g., PETER W. RODMAN & HENRY KISSINGER, PRESIDENTIAL 
COMMAND 145 (2009); STEVEN F. HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN 252 
(2009); JOEL D. ABERBACH & MARK A. PETERSON, EDS., THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 27 (2005). 
 
54 See Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, supra note __. 
 
55 See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate 
Responses to Executive Branch Nominations, 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 1122, 1142 (1999) (noting that the Senate’s role in the appointments 
process “give[s] it a privileged position in bureaucratic politics”); 143 
CONG. REC. D2 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1997) (reporting that the Senate 
considered over 3,800 nominees to civilian positions in the executive 
branch during the 104th Congress). 
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B. “Independent” Agencies  
 
Are independent agencies “independent” of political influence, or 
merely free from presidential control?56  Many of the design features of 
independent agencies appear aimed at insulating agency decision-makers 
from all outside sources of political influence.  Features such as the lack of 
any one actor exercising complete control over appointment decisions, the 
presence of for-cause removal provisions, fixed term lengths that span 
multiple congressional or presidential election cycles, and expertise 
requirements that prospective appointees must meet all conceivably could 
shield independent agencies from political pressure emanating from any 
outside source.57 
 The notion that these institutional design measures at least partially 
insulate independent agencies from presidential politics is widely accepted 
among scholars.58  The extent to which independent agencies are shielded 
                                                     
56 The term “independent agency” may have different meanings for 
different observers.  The most commonly accepted definition of agency 
independence is that the President may only remove the agency head for 
just cause.  See, e.g., Berry & Gersen, supra note __; Lisa Schultz Bressman 
& Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 599, 610 (2010); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by 
Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000).  For other definitions, see Jacob E. 
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE 
AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, eds., 
2010) (employing a totality-of-the-circumstances test, with an agency’s 
placement along an “independent-to-executive-dominated scale” involving 
a multi-factor assessment); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The 
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
801 (1991) (considering whether an agency was established outside of an 
existing cabinet department as the relevant measure of independence). 
 
57 See Terry M. Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1 (2006).  But cf. Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary 
Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1993) (arguing that the attitudes of the relevant 
political actors may be more important than these more concrete factors in 
determining the degree of presidential control).  
 
58 See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: 
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
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from congressional influence, however, is less clear.  One perspective holds 
that the design features common to independent agencies make these 
entities autonomous from political actors in general – including, 
presumably, Congress.59  For instance, consider for-cause removal 
provisions, which not only restrict the President’s ability to dismiss senior 
agency leaders, but also prevent members of Congress from pressuring the 
President to do so.60  Furthermore, a strand of case law casts a skeptical eye 
                                                                                                                                      
459, 464 (2008) (“when members of Congress fear the administrative 
influence of the current President on policies post-enactment, they are more 
likely to create independent commissions”); B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, 
Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design, 66 J. 
POL. 176, 199 (2004) (asserting that “when there is high executive-
legislative conflict,” Congress creates independent agencies to “constrain 
the president and future legislative coalitions”); Kagan, supra note __, at 
2271 (noting that limitations on the President’s removal powers serve to 
“insulate the administrative state from the President”); DAVID EPSTEIN & 
SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 154-62 (1999) (finding that 
Congress is less likely to create agencies under presidential control during 
periods of divided government, and suggesting that Congress believes that 
creating independent agencies could limit the power that an opposition-
party President may wield).   
 
59 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376–77 (2006) (noting that independent 
agencies were intended “as means to limit the sphere over which partisan 
political power could exert control”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and 
Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (adding the 
independent agencies are “designed to isolate … decisionmakers from 
politics”). 
 
60 For-cause removal provisions typically allow dismissal only for 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2006) (removal provision for members of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission).  Thus, agency policymakers may take lawful 
actions that conflict with other political actors’ preferences, without fear of 
being removed from office.  See Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking 
and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
596, 609 (1989).  It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court 
has not defined what constitutes “good cause” reasons for removal, creating 
a degree of uncertainty in the doctrine.  See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 
729 (stating that removal provisions are “very broad and, as interpreted by 
Congress, could sustain removal … for any number of actual or perceived 
transgressions”). 
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towards the argument that certain common features of independent agencies 
serve to pull agency decision-makers towards congressional preferences.  In 
Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court accepted on its face 
congressional arguments that fixed terms for some agency officials are 
needed for bureaucratic efficacy – and not for the purposes of congressional 
aggrandizement at the President’s expense.61  More recently, in Morrison v. 
Olson, the Court rejected the view that a congressionally-created removal 
protection provision – restricting the Attorney General’s ability to remove 
the independent counsel – constituted a congressional attempt “to gain a 
role in the removal of executive officials.”62  In addition, recent law review 
commentary concerning the establishment of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau reflects the view that the establishment of fixed terms for 
the agency’s director – another feature of independent agencies – will 
insulate that agency not only from the White House, but also from 
Congress.63 
An opposing perspective contends that design features common to 
independent agencies do not insulate these entities from political influence 
in general, but rather serve to move agency decisions away from 
presidential preferences and towards Congress.64  According to Steven 
                                                                                                                                      
   
61 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (noting that 
“legislative reports … clearly reflect the view that a fixed term was 
necessary to the effective and fair administration of the law”).  The Court’s 
willingness to allow institutional designers to insulate agency personnel 
from the President, however, has its limits.  See Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accountability Oversight Board, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010) 
(prohibiting “dual for-cause limitations on the removal” of Board members, 
in a situation where members of the Board and of its supervising entity both 
enjoyed for-cause removal protections); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 121 
(disallowing congressional appointment of Federal Election 
Commissioners). 
 
62 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657 (1988).   
 
63 Administrative Law – Agency Design – Dodd-Frank Act Creates the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2125 
(2011). 
 
64 See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
(2008); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies].  See also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Qualifications: Law 
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Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, when institutional designers isolate 
agencies from the President, Congress fills the power vacuum.65  Case 
studies concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
Federal Trade Commission, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission provide 
support for this assertion, showing that these “independent” agencies are 
remarkably attune to congressional preferences.66  The Supreme Court in 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations put the matter most bluntly, concluding: 
“independent agencies are sheltered not from politics, but from the 
President, and … their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) 
has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional 
direction.”67 
                                                                                                                                      
and Practice of Selecting Agency Leaders, Working Paper (2011) (detailing 
congressionally-imposed qualifications requirements for certain executive 
branch officials, the presence of which may empower Congress at the 
President’s expense). 
 
65 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582-83 (“There is no such thing in 
Washington as a politically ‘independent’ agency.”). 
 
66 See Hedge & Johnson, supra note __ (determining that the EEOC and 
NRC decreased their regulatory requirements following the transfer of 
congressional power to deregulation-favoring Republicans in 1995); 
Weingast & Moran, supra note __ (describing how the FTC seriously 
considered the political preferences of those congressional subcommittees 
with jurisdiction over the agency). 
 
67 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
1800, 1815 (2009).  Why is it that independent agencies could be 
considered subject to greater congressional, rather than presidential, 
control?  First, with the President exercising comparatively less control over 
independent agencies than executive departments, the relative balance of 
power between the White House and Congress for influence may simply 
shift in the latter’s favor.  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note __, at 583 
(“[A]bsent presidential control, congressional oversight and appropriations 
powers become the only concern for the officers of the allegedly 
‘independent’ agencies”).  Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (providing a 
“hydraulic pressure” rationale for why one institution would gain relative 
power if restrictions are placed on a competing institution’s ability to exert 
influence).  Second, independent agencies may be more susceptible to 
interest group capture than executive departments, and these deeper ties to 
interest groups, in turn, link independent agencies more closely with 
Congress.  See Herbert Kaufman, Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of 
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 These two perspectives provide competing views on the extent to 
which independent agencies are subservient to Congress.  To assess these 
perspectives, I examine the connections between two common features of 
independent agencies – fixed terms for appointees and statutory mandates 
on appointee qualifications68 – and congressional oversight activity.  A 
hypothetical finding that agencies with these characteristics are subject to 
greater congressional attention than are those agencies over which the 
President’s authority is less restricted would suggest that independent 
agencies may not be truly independent.  Instead, this hypothetical finding 
would suggest that these entities may more accurately be considered 
congressionally-controlled agencies – or, at least, agencies over which 
Congress exercises relatively more power.  A contrary or null finding – 
either that these agencies are subject to less attention from congressional 
overseers than are executive departments, or that one cannot draw any 
conclusions with sufficient certainty – would suggest that perhaps 
independent agencies are truly independent, with their design features 
effectively limiting some forms of congressional as well as presidential 
                                                                                                                                      
Public Administration, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1057, 1063 (1956); see also 
Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the 
Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1701-02 (2009) (describing 
interest group capture of congressional committees); Scher, supra note __, 
at 533-34 (noting that legislators “who have established mutually rewarding 
relationships with agency people tend to be reluctant to … engage in a close 
review of that agency’s affairs”).  If independent agencies are in fact more 
likely to be captured, then this subcommittee-agency-interest group nexus 
will likely be stronger – and, thus, the potential for congressional influence 
higher – for independent agencies than executive departments. 
 
68 Appointee qualification requirements often relate to potential appointees’ 
professional training or background.  See, e.g., the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, §611(11) (2006), 6 
U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (requiring that the FEMA administrator possess both “a 
demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and 
homeland security” and at least “five years of executive leadership and 
management experience”); 49 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1)-(2) (2006); 15 U.S.C. 
§§7211(e)(1)-(2) (2006); and 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (2006) (requiring that 
members of, respectively, the Surface Transportation Board, Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, and Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board possess expertise in their relevant areas); Barkow, supra note 
__, at 47-48 (noting that other executive branch subunits place restrictions 
on leaders’ concurrent employment and investments or post-public service 
employment). 
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influence.  Hypotheses 7 and 8 test these claims. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Agencies with fixed terms for appointees receive 
greater oversight attention from Congress. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Agencies with statutory mandates regarding appointee 
qualifications receive greater oversight attention. 
 
C. Foreign Policy Function 
 
Perhaps the most obvious agency feature that may be correlated with 
oversight levels is the agency’s subject matter.69  According to Aaron 
Wildavsky’s well-known “two presidencies” thesis, Congress is more likely 
to defer to the President’s judgment in the realm of foreign affairs.70  
Although this theory is not without its critics, it retains significant currency 
among many scholars.71  Therefore, one might expect lower oversight 
activity in concerning foreign policy issues.  Hypothesis 5 captures this 
logic. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Congress devotes less attention to agencies that are 
focused on foreign policy issues. 
 
IV. CONNECTING AGENCY DESIGN TO CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION 
 
                                                     
69 Of course, an agency’s function is not a “design feature” in the same 
sense as the other features discussed in this article.  Still, this factor is 
included as a potentially important control variable. 
 
70 Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, 4 TRANS-ACTION 7 (1966).  
 
71 Compare WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS 
GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007); 
David Karol, Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado about 
Nothing, 54 INT’L ORG. 825 (2000) (questioning the validity of Wildavsky’s 
thesis) and Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell, & David E. Lewis, 
Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of 
the Two Presidencies Thesis, 70 J. POL. 1 (2008); JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS 
AND BULLETS: THE ELUSIVE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1998); LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995) (all offering at least qualified support for 
the theory). 
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These hypotheses are tested using the previously-described agency 
infractions and oversight hearings datasets.72  The unit of analysis is the 
individual infraction.  The dependent variable is an event count of the 
number of oversight hearings held by committees and subcommittees 
between the 102nd and 109th Congresses (1991-2006) for each infraction. 
Next, I operationalize the agency design hypotheses as independent 
variables.  To determine whether an agency can be considered a 
congressional or executive creation, I examined whether the agency came 
into being via a specific statute or some other means.73  Following political 
scientist David Lewis’s lead, I considered an agency to be created by 
legislation only if a statute explicitly mandated that a new organizational 
unit be created.74  Lewis provides these data for agencies created between 
1946 and 1997 in a publicly available online database.75  For all other years, 
                                                     
72  Before proceeding to test these hypotheses, it is important to note that 
agency design features are not randomly assigned, leading to a potential 
endogeneity concern.  Rather, members of Congress may design 
administrative institutions with a deliberate eye towards making certain 
agencies relatively more responsive to current and future Congresses, and 
other agencies relatively more responsive to current and future presidents.  
The extent to which Congress engages in strategic institutional design of 
this sort is not known, but could be explored in future research.  Even if one 
believes that such behavior occurs with any regularity, however, the 
analysis in this article is still valuable, as it offers insights into the degree to 
which such efforts are successful. 
 
73 “Agencies” are defined to include independent agencies, commissions, 
and all organizational units located one level below executive departments.  
Due to difficulties obtaining data, subunits within the Executive Office of 
the President are excluded from the analysis. 
 
74 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 
(2003).  All other methods of agency establishment – e.g., executive order, 
reorganization plan, departmental order, or, in a few instances, 
congressional delegation of authority to create a new unit (without requiring 
that the executive branch create the new unit) – were considered executive-
driven.  See Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, 
supra note __. 
 
75 David E. Lewis, Replication data for: Presidents and the Politics of 
Agency Design: Administrative Insulation Data Set, 2003, available at IQSS 
Dataverse Network, 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:19
02.1/10129&studyListingIndex=0_d1de20ebf2b96353b798a93359b8. 
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I examined government publications to determine the method by which 
each included agency was established.76 
To identify whether each agency’s head is subject to Senate 
confirmation, I consulted The Plum Book, a directory of individuals holding 
policy positions in the federal government.77  Information on whether an 
agency’s leaders have fixed terms or the existence of any limitations on 
whom the President may appoint to these positions – e.g., partisan balance 
or experiential requirements – also were obtained from this source.78  Data 
on whether agencies have a foreign policy focus were derived in part from 
the Lewis dataset.79  For those agencies not included in the Lewis dataset, I 
made subjective determinations of whether the agency deals primarily with 
defense, foreign affairs, or international development.80 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the independent variable 
values associated with these agencies, as well as other potentially relevant 
characteristics.81 
                                                                                                                                      
 
76 These publications include the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 
and CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY serials, as well as GEORGE T. KURIAN, ET 
AL., EDS., A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1988). 
 
77 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, THE PLUM BOOK: UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (2008). 
 
78 Appointments that the President does not control are included in this 
category as well.  Also note that despite the fact that party balance is not 
required for National Labor Relations Board, by tradition no more than 
three of the Board’s maximum five members have been from the same 
political party.  See Henry Hogue, et al., Presidential Appointments to Full-
Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and 
Commissions, 109th Congress, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, November 14, 
2008. Therefore, I classify the NLRB as requiring partisan balance. 
 
79 Lewis, Replication data for: Presidents and the Politics of Agency 
Design, supra note __. 
 
80 See Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, supra 
note __ (providing this three-pronged definition of “foreign affairs”). 
 
81 The “agency function” classifications reported in the table are based on 
categories described in AAGE R. CLAUSEN, HOW CONGRESSMEN DECIDE: A 
POLICY FOCUS (1973), as updated by Lewis, Administrative Agency 
Insulation Data Set Code Book, supra note __, and by the author.  Agencies 
may be assigned to multiple categories. 
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Table 3: Agency Characteristics 
 Total 
 
Basic Characteristics 
Number of agencies included 271 
    Created via statutory enactment 202 
 
Agency Function 
Foreign affairs 53 
Social welfare  107 
Fiscal, tax or monetary  34 
Regulatory 61 
Law enforcement 24 
 
Agency Leadership 
Headed by Senate-confirmed appointee 174 
Leader serves for fixed term 37 
Limits on President’s appointment powers 42 
   
 
Having established the unit of analysis and all variables, I now turn 
to estimating a set of Poisson regression models to determine the 
correlations between these explanatory variables and the number of 
oversight hearings to which each agency was subject.  Poisson regression is 
appropriate for event-count dependent variables, as here, that are not over-
dispersed.82  This model also includes committee- and Congress-level fixed 
                                                                                                                                      
 
82 Poisson regression is a generalized linear regression model using the 
Poisson distribution.  The model takes the following functional form: 
 
Yi = β0 + β1X1,i + …  + βkXk,i + γ2E2 + … + γnEn + δ2T2 + … +  δtTt + μi 
 
where Yi is the dependent variable, with i being each infraction included in 
the database; β1 through βk are the coefficient estimates for each of the Xk 
explanatory variables listed above, E2 through En are a set of binary 
regressors representing each full committee in the dataset (except one, E1); 
γ2 through γn are the coefficient estimates for each full committee binary 
regressors; T2 through Tt are a set of binary regressors corresponding to each 
Congress (except one, T1) during the period under study (the 102
nd-109th  
Congresses, 1991-2006); δ2 through δt are the coefficient estimates for the 
binary time/Congress regressors; and μi is the error term. 
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effects terms.83 
Figure 1 reports the results of regression models examining the 
bivariate relationships between congressional subcommittee oversight and 
five agency characteristics: 
 
 whether the agency was created via statutory enactment 
(Hypothesis 1: “Congress-created”); 
 whether the Senate plays an advice-and-consent role in the 
appointment of the agency’s leadership (Hypothesis 2: “Senate-
confirmed” – estimated for the Senate only); 
 whether its leadership serves for a fixed term (Hypothesis 3: 
“Fixed Term”); 
 whether there are limits placed on whom the President may 
appoint to lead the agency (Hypothesis 4: “Limitations on 
Appointment”); and 
                                                     
83 To see why fixed effects are appropriate, consider that there are 
undoubtedly many other factors, varying either across Congresses or time-
invariantly across committees, that affect congressional oversight activity.  
Macro-level explanatory variables that are thought to influence oversight 
levels include the presence of divided or unified government; presidential 
approval levels; majority party size and ideological cohesion; the passage of 
major laws delegating authority to agencies; and the overall size of the 
administrative state.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note __; 
MAYHEW,  DIVIDED WE GOVERN, supra note __; ABERBACH, supra note __.  
In addition, agency behavior, exogenous events, and subcommittee and 
committee characteristics are likely to affect oversight levels.  For instance, 
subcommittees with expansive jurisdictions, energetic leaders, or those that 
are nested within certain parent committees may tend to engage in oversight 
more frequently.  See supra Part II (detailing the connections between 
subcommittee political preferences, the larger macro-partisan environment, 
and subcommittee oversight). The inclusion of fixed effects for each 
Congress during the 1991-2006 period (except for one, the baseline 
category) allows one to control for unobservable or unmeasurable variables 
that are unique to a given period, e.g., the partisan composition of the 
political branches, the President’s popularity, etc.).  Likewise, the inclusion 
of fixed effects for each committee (again, except for one) serves to control 
for unobservable or unmeasurable covariates that may change over time, but 
not over subunits, and that may be linked to the frequency with which 
agencies are overseen.  The results of this model are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications, including the exclusion of either or both of these 
fixed effects terms, as well as the substitution of random- or mixed-effects 
terms in their place. 
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 whether the agency performs a foreign policy-focused function 
(Hypothesis 5: “Foreign Policy Function”).   
 
Tables 1 and 2 contain supplemental information concerning these 
relationships, including estimates of full, multivariate models for both the 
House and Senate. 
 
Figure 1: Agency Characteristics & Congressional Oversight 
 
x-axis: expected number of additional oversight hearings 
 
  
For ease of interpretation, Table 1 reports the results of regression 
models examining the bivariate relationships between House subcommittee 
oversight and five agency characteristics: whether the agency was created 
via statutory enactment (Model 1); whether its leadership serves for a fixed 
term (Model 2); whether there are limits placed on whom the President may 
appoint to lead the agency (Model 3); and whether the agency performs a 
foreign policy-focused function (Model 4).  Model 5 reports the results of a 
full, multivariate model.   
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Table 1: Agency Characteristics & House Oversight 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 
13 
Model 4 Model 
15 
Congress-created 
(Hypothesis 1) 
0.010 
 
(0.071) 
   -0.046 
 
(0.055) 
Senate-Confirmed 
(Hypothesis 2) 
 
 
N/A 
Fixed Term 
(Hypothesis 3) 
 -0.212 
* * * 
(0.030) 
  -0.305 
* * * 
(0.079) 
Limitations on 
Appointment  
(Hypothesis 4) 
  -0.529 
* * * 
(0.077) 
 -0.133 
† 
 (0.069) 
Foreign Policy 
Function 
(Hypothesis 5) 
   -0.304 
* * * 
(0.075) 
-0.118 
 
(0.076) 
Coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) generated with a generalized estimating 
equation (GEE) for Poisson regression.  All models include committee- and Congress-level fixed 
effects.  *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p <0.05, † p < 0.10.  Dependent variable: number of 
House oversight hearings held; unit of analysis: agency infractions, by topic and year (1991-2006).  
Parameter estimates for the intercepts omitted.  All models contain 11,050 observations. 
  
Table 2 reports the results of a similar analysis for the Senate, 
examining the relationship between agency characteristics and Senate 
oversight levels.  This table also reports the connection between Senate 
oversight levels and whether the Senate plays an advice-and-consent role in 
the appointment of an agency’s leadership (Model 7).  
 28 
Table 2: Agency Characteristics & Senate Oversight 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Congress-
created 
(Hypothesis 1) 
0.098 
 
(0.117) 
    -0.070 
 
(0.078) 
Senate-
Confirmed 
(Hypothesis 2) 
 0.525 
* * * 
(0.080) 
   0.552 
* * * 
(0.082) 
Fixed Term 
(Hypothesis 3) 
  -0.346 
* * * 
(0.101) 
  0.096 
 
(0.107) 
Limitations on 
Appointment  
(Hypothesis 4) 
   -0.436 
* * * 
(0.100) 
 -0.359 
* * * 
(0.100) 
Foreign Policy 
Function 
(Hypothesis 5) 
    -0.479 
* 
(0.219) 
-0.543 
* * * 
(0.104) 
Coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) generated with a GEE for Poisson regression.  
All models include committee- and Congress-level fixed effects.  *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p <0.05, † p < 0.10.  Dependent variable: number of Senate oversight hearings; unit of 
analysis: agency infractions, by topic and year (1991-2006).  Parameter estimates for the intercepts 
omitted.  All models contain 11,050 observations.   
 
The results reported in Figure 1 and in Tables 1 and 2 suggest mixed 
support for these hypotheses.  First, the null results associated with 
Hypothesis 1 (“Congress-created”) suggest a lack of connection between an 
agency’s genesis via statute and the amount of attention that Congress 
devotes to overseeing that agency.  On the one hand, Congress does not 
seem to design executive agencies such that future Congresses will consider 
oversight of these agencies to be more worthwhile.  On the other hand, 
neither does it appear that ex ante involvement in the design of 
administrative institutions serves as a substitute for ex post oversight as 
alternative means of controlling the administrative state, as some scholars 
have theorized.84 
                                                     
84 See Bawn, Choosing Strategies, supra note __, at 101 (“Plans to engage 
in ex post oversight make the benefits of statutory control less compelling, 
and vice-versa.  In this sense, statutory control and oversight can be viewed 
as ‘substitutes’ in the ‘production’ of a controlled bureaucracy.”).  Cf. 
McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note __, at 166 (noting that, by empowering 
interest groups to participate in policymaking processes and providing 
remedies to these groups when agencies pursue policies that they oppose, 
congressionally-created administrative procedures can serve as a partial 
substitute for direct congressional monitoring of the administrative state). 
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Second, the Senate engages in more frequent oversight of agencies 
whose leaders are Senate-confirmed appointees.  In developing Hypothesis 
2 (“Senate-confirmed”), I noted that body’s role in confirming certain 
agency heads may provide the Senate with greater influence over those 
agencies.  Consequently, I theorized, the Senate will find oversight hearings 
concerning these agencies to be more effective, and therefore devote greater 
attention to them.  The positive, statistically significant coefficient estimates 
reported in Figure 1 and in Tables 1 and 2 support this hypothesis. 
Third, agencies with two characteristics commonly associated with 
independence – fixed terms and qualification requirements for appointees – 
receive less oversight attention.  The notion that these design features not 
only restrict presidential control over agencies, but also congressional 
control, seems logical. Any political principal is likely to have more limited 
potential rewards or punishments to offer an appointee with a fixed term in 
office.  Likewise, constraints placed on appointee qualifications restrict the 
pool of potential replacements for a given agency head.  If Congress and an 
agency head are aware of the fact that the agency head is relatively less 
replaceable, that knowledge may diminish the potential benefits to Congress 
of overseeing that agency.  This reduced attention to oversight empowers 
agency leaders as autonomous actors.  In this way, independent agencies 
may be said to be more independent of congressional – as well as 
presidential – control than are executive agencies. 
Finally, the coefficient estimates in Tables 1 and 2 report a 
statistically significant relationship between oversight activity and whether 
an agency has a foreign policy focus, in accordance with Hypothesis 5.  
This relative lack of oversight attention to foreign policy-focused agencies 
provides some empirical support for Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis.  
Whether based on traditional norms of deference to the President in the 
realm of foreign affairs, a relative lack of opportunities for reelection-
oriented legislators to credit-claim on foreign policy issues, or some other 
reason, Congress appears relatively less interested in overseeing agencies in 
this area. 
CONCLUSION 
 These findings have obvious implications for the design of 
administrative agencies to facilitate congressional control.  For instance, the 
null finding concerning the relationship between oversight and an agency’s 
creation at the hands of Congress or the President casts doubt on a received 
wisdom that the Congress-agency connection will be strongest for those 
agencies created via statutory enactment.85  This result provides tentative 
                                                                                                                                      
 
85 See Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast, supra note __, at 604. 
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support for the idea that Congress may delegate broad powers to the 
executive at the agency design stage, while retaining influence in agency 
decision-making.86  In addition, the finding that the Senate more vigorously 
monitors agencies that are headed by Senate-confirmed appointees has 
important implications for ongoing policy debates.  Recent years have seen 
a number of prominent recess appointments, as presidents bypass the 
Senate’s advice and consent role due to perceived obstructionism in that 
chamber.87  Senators would be well-advised to resist such efforts, not only 
because such appointments eviscerate the Senate’s Article II § 2 role at the 
time of the appointment, but also because recess appointments may 
discourage congressional involvement in the agency in the future.88  Finally, 
the findings that Congress is less likely to oversee agencies headed by 
leaders with fixed terms and qualification requirements – two features that 
are common in and important to independent agencies – offer insights into 
an ongoing discussion among jurists and scholars concerning whether these 
independent agencies may be considered untethered from both presidential 
or congressional control, or whether they simply feel the pull of Capitol Hill 
more than that of the White House.89 
 Of course, the five hypotheses offered herein do not begin to 
exhaust the list of agency design features that may be examined.  As such, 
this article is intended as a first-cut of a potential future research agenda, 
                                                     
86 Perhaps the long intervals between the establishment of new agencies by 
statute and the current period, which allow for considerable “coalitional 
drift” between the enacting legislative coalition and the current Congress, 
weaken the connection between an agency’s establishment via statute and 
current congressional attention.  Cf. Horn & Shepsle, supra note __ 
(defining “coalitional drift”), 
 
87 See Chafetz, supra note __, at 764-67. 
 
88 The solution, however, ought not be to reduce the number of positions 
requiring Senate confirmation, as a 2011 bill – which passed the Senate 79-
20! – proposed to do.  Presidential Appointment Efficiency and 
Streamlining Act of 2011, S. 679, 112th Cong. (proposing an end to the 
requirement of Senate confirmation for over 200 appointed positions); 
accord Chafetz, supra note __, at 767. 
 
89 Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 657; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624 
(offering the former perspective); and Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 
1815; LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 
__;  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note __, at 582-83; Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies, supra note __ (for the latter view). 
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with numerous possibilities for extensions.  Scholarly understanding of the 
role that Congress plays in administration could be enhanced by taking a 
page from the rich literature on agency design and presidential control over 
administration, and examining whether design features intended to increase 
presidential influence also result in a corresponding weakening of 
congressional monitoring.  For instance, one could explore the extent to 
which the following features – all of which are thought to influence the 
degree of presidential control over agencies – also impact congressional 
control: exemptions from OIRA cost-benefit analyses;90 the presence of 
multi-member boards or commissions;91 statutory partisan balance 
requirements for these multi-member entities;92 an agency’s ratio of civil 
servants-to-appointees;93 and the extent to which an agency’s workforce is 
unionized.94 
                                                     
90 See Barkow, supra note __, at 26. 
 
91 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note __, at 610 (theorizing that multi-
member agencies are less susceptible to presidential influence, because the 
presence of staggered terms reduces the potential influence of the current 
president, who typically cannot immediately replace all board members).  
See also Devins & Lewis, supra note __, at 468-69 (noting that it typically 
takes presidents nine or ten months to replace a majority of commission 
members). 
 
92 See Breger & Edles, supra note __, at 1139 (noting that party balance is 
required for some – but not all – multi-member entities).  Partisan balance 
requirements may provide an additional degree of distance between these 
entities and the White House.  But see Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, 
Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential Appointments to 
Independent Agencies, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 91, 95 (2000) (providing 
examples of Republican presidents appointing conservative Democrats, and 
Democratic presidents appointing liberal Republicans to commissions with 
partisan quotas). 
 
93 See LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 
__, at 98 (stating that a larger proportion of appointees may strengthen 
presidential control); Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, Political 
Appointees vs. Career Civil Servants: A Multiple Principals Theory of 
Political Bureaucracies, 10 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 465 (1994) (positing that an 
agency designed with a greater mix of civil servants will be more 
responsive to the legislature, since both civil servants and legislators have 
longer-term political horizons). 
 
94 Public sector unions may either insulate the administrative state from 
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Beyond importing concepts from the literature on presidential 
control of administration into the congressional context, one could examine 
the efficacy of statutory provisions that Congress includes in agencies’ 
organic statutes for the purpose of enhancing congressional ex post control 
over these agencies.  For instance, how useful was Congress’s 
establishment of inspectors general offices?95  One also could test whether 
provisions granting specified congressional committees a veto over certain 
agency actions – which endure in the wake of Chadha – are effective 
mechanisms for enhancing congressional control.96 
 Additional work on designing administrative institutions to enhance 
congressional control over the administrative state could have real-world 
value.  This article suggests that the Congress-centric design of 
administrative institutions could serve as a partial corrective for the large-
scale transfer of policymaking authority from the legislative branch to the 
executive in recent decades,97 by encouraging congressional ex post review 
of agency actions.  This article, however, is limited to examining only a 
small sample of the much larger population of structural decisions that 
institutional designers may consider.  Empirical studies of those agency 
design features that may facilitate congressional oversight represent a 
promising area for future research. 
Although examining connections between various agency design 
features and congressional oversight is a descriptive project, the 
implications of this work are prescriptive.  This article shows that it is 
possible to tailor the structure of congressional and administrative 
institutions to alter the role that Congress plays in administration.  In an era 
of greater presidential control over administration, oversight holds promise 
as a means of re-equilibrating the balance of power between the White 
House and Capitol Hill.  If one cares about enhancing congressional 
capacity to direct administrative agencies, this article encourages one to 
devote attention to the institutional design of these entities. 
                                                                                                                                      
presidential leadership in general or enable a president to lock-in current 
agency preferences.  See Chen & Johnson, supra note __ (testing the latter 
theory); Moe, supra note __ (explaining the former theory).  
 
95 See Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App. 3. 
 
96 See Fisher, supra note __ (noting the persistence of both formal 
committee veto provisions inserted into statutes and informal 
understandings, with veto-like effects, between committees and agencies).  
 
97 See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979). 
 
  
 
